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Abstract   
The novelty of Shibani’s earning model is its integration of Zakat and other social giving in 
the social welfare function, which makes the consumer utility a multi-dimensional devotional, 
material, ethical, social, Shariah-compliant function. In the model, the consumer’s income 
evolves increasingly from imperative earning that covers consumer’s basic needs, to 
recommended earning that covers basic needs of relatives; and to permissible earning that 
covers the poor’s needs. Accordingly, the model has imperative, recommended, and 
permissible utility. The rich consumer draws additional utility from Zakat spending in favor 
of the poor consumers. Based on the social solidarity, we show that the marginal earning 
depends on the first difference between the MPC of lower and upper social groups. The 
permissible marginal utility is related to the faith interaction and enhances the social utility as 
social transfer is paid to poor and needy groups.  
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1. Introduction  
After the international financial crisis, there are several academic institutions, such as the 
Institute for New Economic Thinking (INET 2011), that renew the economic paradigms and 
exhibit the ethical dimension to understand more the economic and financial behaviors of the 
individual and groups in the community. Previously, the economic theory of Keynes (1936) 
involves the animal instincts to explain the individual economic behaviors that are related to 
the extent of the optimism, pessimism and overconfidence (Pirosca 2011). The ethical utility 
theory is more relevant to explain some economic behaviors (Khan 2013, Schneider and 
Krieger and Bayraktar 2011). But, the ethical utility theory needs to be developed knowing 
that the concept of utility does not adhere to religious teachings (Parada-Contzen and Parada-
Daza 2013). We cannot develop ethical dimension and metaphysical faith of human being in 
economic analysis without considering what is related to the religion which connects the 
worldly life to the afterlife (Nixon 2007, Barro and McCleary 2006).  
Ng and Lee (2015) analyze in details some topics like the cross-cultural consumer 
behavior and the consumer impulsivity but recognize that there are substantial gaps in the 
related literature. Such gaps include consumer and faith, consumer and overspending, ethical 
consumption, and materialism and compensatory consumption that warrant more 
investigation as traditional topics but with new approaches and renewed concepts. This paper 
attempts to fill some gaps by analyzing the effects of ethics and Islamic belief holding on the 
consumer behavior. Despite that the standard economics model attempts to moralize the 
economic and financial life (Sauer 2003; Sen 1987; Harsanyi 1955), the usual paradigms did 
only address the materialistic consumer satisfaction subjected to the budget spending 
constraint, even if the consumer finances his expenses through private banks borrowing.  
The society income can be divided into three groups to analyze their consumption efforts 
by comparing their distinct marginal propensity to consume (hereafter MPC). According to 
Shibani’s (750-805 AD) analysis of the earning, we can model the ethical behavior of the 
consumer using the Halal utility theory and the layers of earning.
1
 Chapra’s approach (2000) 
sets for all layers the ordinal level of imperatives, recommended and permissible needs, 
instead of multiple layers. The multilayer approach is more appropriate and depends on the 
income power in Shibani meaning; the layer of needs corresponds to the layer of earning. But, 
it remains that the variability in satisfying the layer of needs depends on individual layer of 
earning, time of spending, belief holding and ethics in economic behaviors. Due to the 
confusion in belonging to the right cluster of income, the consumerism that guides to satisfy 
the excessive desires, generates selfishness and often leads to frustration and futility of 
material G&S, because it does not achieve self-welfare.  
There are many theoretical papers analyzing the consumer behavior using Islamic 
economics paradigm as Kahf (1981), Khan (1984 and 1992), Iqbal (1985), Zarqa (1980 and 
1992), Ben Jilali and Taher (1989), Mahboub (1991), Zaman (1992), Ben Jilali and Azzamil 
                                                 
1 The Halal utility corresponds to lawful utility versus unlawful (Haram) as defined by the Shariah.   
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(1992), Hasan (2005). For instance, Kahf (1981) included the Zakat
2
 rate in the usual utility 
function. He considered implicitly that the Muslim looks up to maximize his/her worldly life 
utility and his/her expected afterlife utility functions. Besides, Zarqa (1992) suggested an 
implicit partial explanation focusing on the comparison between worldly life outcome of the 
utility function and its afterlife recompense. Hasan (2005) considered the utility function as an 
analytical tool to measure the expected satisfaction respecting the legal and moral obligations.  
By using Shibani classification of earning, we find that the Zakat may increase the 
overall MPC since it transfers income from lower MPC groups (i.e., rich people) to higher 
MPC groups (i.e., poor people). Besides, considering the utility function of the wealthy group, 
we find that the social welfare function and the religious-motivation render the affluent 
consumer’s permissible marginal utility connected to the interaction of his/her belief holding 
with the change in the utility satisfaction of the poor and middle groups. We show that 
through the religious faith holding the wealthy group gets not only a unitary value of the 
elasticity as a limit superior of their asymptotic elasticity of the utility in the worldly life, but 
also an optimum of the marginal utility with asymptotic elasticity greater than one in the 
afterlife.     
The Zakat effect consists of a redistributive mechanism that increases the income of 
lower layer of earnings in the society. Such effect works continuously along the time because 
it depends on the Zakat-period of each member of the wealthy group. The implications of 
Zakat can be detected in consumption and spending efforts of the lower social groups, 
meaning that their well-being is improved. The Zakat mechanism, and particularly when it is 
monitored by government institutions, leads to ameliorate the conditions life of the needy 
people and it implies economic growth at all. The welfare assistance through Zakat system 
and voluntary giving reduce the inequalities in earnings and re-initiate the process of 
satisfaction in all layers of the society, improving thus the quality of life. In Islamic ethical 
sense, the social solidarity means mutual support that could help to face any economic or 
financial difficulties at individual or family level. Such solidarity, alimented by emotional 
bonds, improves the social security system since it is a part of the financial worship system in 
Islam.  
Due to the globalization, the technology processes and the inflation, the Social solidarity 
has been a priority for both nongovernmental associations and governments to secure the 
needy people (e.g., Poor Laws in the United Kingdom). According to Bjorvatn (2003, 2006), 
the effect of globalization on people’s disposable income requires increasing redistribution 
process. The globalization and its social implications, leading to expanded modes of 
                                                 
2 Etymologically, the term Zakat means purification in the religious sense because it is a mandatory financial 
worship. Such purification becomes effective when the income, saving and invested assets reach together a 
defined threshold, which is determined by the value of 85 grams of pure gold by the current price of the standard 
gold bar. It consists of transferring money, via government or associations specific channels (or directly if no any 
channels), to those having incomes below a definite threshold. The Zakat is a soft Islamic-tax because its rate is 
low varying from 0.025 to 0.10; its system consists of a first re-distribution of the wealth in the economy. For 
more basic analysis-oriented Islamic economics, the reader can find more details in Hasan (2015), Askari, Iqbal 
and Mirakhor (2015), and Asutay (2007).   
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consumption and accelerated growth in credit, exhibit the importance of re-distributional 
efforts of social community and government through specific programs to reduce the 
increased inequalities mostly in wealth, education, and housing. 
The implemented social solidarity is realized through many mechanisms as Zakat funds, 
social spending funds (social Infaq) and Waqf
3
 funds in addition to other social connections 
that improve the fraternity between society members whose are individually and collectively 
responsible. These mechanisms are part of Islamic economics principles. The social solidarity 
is also subjected to the trust in Islamic government, which can intervene to enhance the poor’s 
through education, health, and infrastructure without impeding economic growth and wealth 
creation. The institutionalization of Zakat is a State responsibility; however Sadakat and Waqf 
are running and managed mainly by social foundations and associations.
4
  
This paper is organized as follows; by considering Shibani’s approach along with the 
Zakat transfer, the spending model is detailed in Section 2 by analyzing the outcomes of the 
marginal propensity to spend and the marginal propensity to earn. We also discuss the utility 
layers depending on the imperative, recommended and the permissible earnings in Section 3, 
and we conclude in Section 4.  
 
2. Modeling Shibani’s Concepts of the Spending  
2.1 Concepts of Earning and Spending  
If the theoretical economic works of Shibani are not yet explored (Khassawneh 2010, Mustafa 
2011), we can explore the Shibani model of spending associated with three levels of earning. 
The earning includes all Halal sources of income from all Shariah-compliant activities such as 
the leasing, trade, agriculture and the industry. The theory of consumption remained confined 
to the conventional economic approach. Shibani’s concept of the earning net of the Zakat is 
much more meaningful than the usual concept of the available income. The Muslim earner 
may increase his/her attempt in an ethical and worship sense to achieve more self and family 
expenses. Such consumer behavior is dynamic in its earning processes and connects 
continuously the worldly life to the afterlife. Besides, Shibani explained the importance of 
saving, which is fundamental for accumulating capital and increasing wealth, through the 
permissible abstinence as mentioned in his Kitab AlKassb (The Book of Earning) on page 10: 
“The decline in spending on the relatives –or blood relationship- leads to his rupture of 
relations, then the earning is recommended for him to spend for his relatives, after that he can 
expand his earning and save more money or he can decides that his earn is enough, because 
among the predecessors -mercy of the Almighty Allah on them- whom saved money and 
some of them did not save money; then both behaviors are permissible.” 
                                                 
3 The Waqf is defined as a permanent transfer of any property from personal ownership to ownership of the 
Almighty Allah. It is managed through a philanthropic sector.   
4 During Omar Ibn Abdulaziz’s sovereign (682-720G), the collection of Zakat was effectively implemented by 
the government in line with prescribed Zakat rules, leading to full satiation of poor groups and an accumulation 
of Zakat in goods such as cereals, olive oil, dates, etc. (not in money) which could not find poor recipients. This 
outcome could be more related to the observance of the social and economic justice in Islamic society.   
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The rationality of the Islamic consumer behavior
5
 is augmented by a faith dimension 
which establishes faith relationships between worldly life and afterlife. There exists a 
materialistic logic that could conduct to optimal satisfaction in the earthly life. Moreover, if 
this optimality is based on the afterlife dimension, which is the case for the believers, it will 
generate augmented afterlife satisfaction too. Such double logic leads to a “dual” utility which 
can be termed by Falah (i.e. success) used by many Islamic economists. The eternal utility 
function would apply for the afterlife.
6
     
According to Shibani’s definition, the concept of earning indicates the acquiring of 
income through legitimate ways. The earning is one of the most important determinants of 
spending, as well as the spending on self and family consumption requires self-abstention 
from the wasteful and the niggardliness to accomplish an accepted spending by the Almighty 
All-Provider. Also, the social spending of a fraction of the Halal earning is required to 
maximize the utility in the worldly life and the afterlife. The economic analysis of Shibani 
makes the consumer utility function a multi-dimensional devotional, material, ethical, social, 
Shariah-compliant function. There are three layers of earning: (i) the imperative; (ii) the 
recommended; and (iii) the permissible. Furthermore, Shibani details the self-spending in 
enlarged meaning which includes the personal spending and the spending for all members of 
his/her family and his/her parents. Here, the Islamic consumption theory makes progress in 
the social dimension of the human being compared to the conventional economics analysis in 
conventional cognitive paradigm, which focuses on the individual selfishness i.e. the 
egocentricity. According to Shibani, the recommended and permissible earnings of the 
individual support the implementing of a social spending which improves his/her belief 
holding or ethical returns. The social spending includes all of the worshipful expenses such as 
Zakat and others social giving that are allowed and given to the relatives and the other 
families of the Islamic community.      
According to Shibani (750-805), the layers of earning are arranged from imperative 
earning, recommended earning and the permissible earning, respectively. The imperative 
earning concerns what meet the basic needs of the individual him/her self, his/her familial 
dependents and his/her parents through the kindest expenditure. These needs are related to 
food, clothing, housing, remedy, education and transportation means. The necessary earn 
helps to settle the previous licit debt, if any, and to make a possible saving effort by deferring 
a fraction of his/her consumption spending for the coming days.
7
  
                                                 
5 The literature in Islamic economics-oriented behaviors is still in its first step as research program about 
Behavioral Islamic Economics (BIE). There are many complicated issues involving poverty, obesity, charitable 
giving, increasing faith-holding among others. 
6 As suggested by the reviewer #1, it is relevant to distinguish utility from “Falah” i.e. earthly and heavenly 
wellbeing, which depend on life, property, faith and intellect.    
7 The utility increases along the three layers of earning. The top social group can satisfy all three levels of utility, 
but the poorest one i.e. the first layer of earning can face difficulties to meet the first level of utility. Thus, the 
three groups have access to different G&S to satisfy different needs. The needs of the family have the character 
of priority, and the imperative needs are not similar between layers of earning.  
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By requesting the reward from the Almighty Allah and through the recommended 
earning, the person aspires, in addition to realizing the needs of the individual and his/her 
dependents, to meet the needs of others members of his/her enlarged family. The marginal 
income through the recommended earning will be the main financial support of the relatives 
and the needy of friends who couldn’t reach their imperative needs. In Shibani’s Kitab 
AlKassb (The Book of Earning) on page 10: “As for non-parents among blood relationship or 
Unmarriageable relatives, it is not suggested that the individual increases his/her earning to 
spend for them. Because their imperative spend is not due on his/her earning except if the 
wealth of the earner allows such social spending. But, he/she is encouraged to earn more and 
to spend for them since this behavior fortifies the blood relationship, and the Shariah 
recommended that.” This marginal earning or earning for goodness, serving to spend on the 
poor and needy groups, is linked to the initial earning that should be basically above the 
threshold of the Zakat (Nissab). Besides, it should serve to spend for the needy Muslim 
community to spread the ethics of the social solidarity i.e. organic cohesion of the individual 
and the family. This solidarity consists of instilling the cooperation and collaboration spirit 
between the individuals and the families of the Muslim society.  
The permissible earning is what expands the earning scope for enlarged spending for 
him/her self, his/her family and other members of the society. It states the increasing 
economic responsibility of the individual and his/her family vis-à-vis the Muslim society. 
Shibani shows that the expansion of the earning stands to be a legitimate request as long as it 
expands the livelihood of people and leads to the public welfare that develops the community 
wellbeing. Also, the expansion of the livelihoods through economic investment may shift over 
time the earning of some needy families to an upper layer of income (second layer). This new 
income may reach the Zakat threshold, or to earn more to become an affluent family among 
the families of the third layer of revenue. 
The marginal earning, either from recommended or permissible learning, was born from 
the social solidarity and transferred to the poor and needy group. It is not necessary that it 
leads to a decline in the MPC of the wealthy group, but may increase even in tiny manner. 
Assuming that the poor group does not yet cover the essentials needs for a decent living. The 
transfer of a significant part of the marginal earning to the needy group leads to increase the 
size of their expenses. Such spending covers food or health or teaching their children or rent 
housing befitting the number of the family members. If the attempt of marginal earning leads 
to a marginal increase in the economic growth, it could achieve a better standard life, 
particularly for the poor group. This attempt is due to the desire of gaining an afterlife reward 
by the middle and affluent groups of the society. The income transfer to the needy group is 
equivalent to the sacrifice size by diminishing the recommended utility of the above middle 
group or/and the permissible utility of the wealthy group. This point will be detailed in section 
3. Therefore, the recommended earning or permissible earning distinguishes the growth 
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system in the Islamic economics and reveals the importance of these variables in explaining 
the volume change of the consumption spending.
8
  
Since the earning is motivated to face the necessities for a decent life leading probably to 
achieve imperative utilities. The attempt to earn more is explained by the expected dynamic 
responses to the needs and extra-needs to satisfy the recommended and permissible utilities of 
the individual and his/her family, respectively. The marginal earning, that drives to a new 
improved layer, is also a dynamic response to satisfy the necessities of the poor and needy 
groups and contribute to more social justice. It consists of shifting some purchasing ability 
from specific groups to lower groups. 
The self-control of the consumer depends on the extent of his belief or faith holding 
which is based on the teachings of Quran and Sunnah. By offering alms, the consumer expects 
more reward in the hereafter than in the worldly file. The multi-levels of the utility depend on 
the earning layer and the degree of belief holding. The social responsibility, as outcomes of 
faith holding, makes the utility function of the wealthy group more sensible to what happens 
regarding utility for poor (first) and needy (middle) groups. The utility function of the middle 
social group would depend on the utility of the first layer of earning. The social responsibility 
increases not only with the earning level but also with the belief holding level. Consequently, 
the relevant constraints of the optimal utility of the wealthy layer group have both a financial 
and ethical-religious nature. 
 
2.2 Augmented marginal propensity to consume 
Many previous papers, such Khan 1984, Ben Jilali and Taher 1989, Ben Jilali and Azzamil 
1992, Mahboub 1991, Khan 1992, Iqbal, 1985, analyzed the impact of Zakat on aggregate 
consumption function of the Muslim economy. From such models, we can compare the 
marginal propensity to consumption spending for each earning group in the community. But 
according to Shibani’s model, the attempt to the recommended and particularly permissible 
earnings has a direct impact on the poor groups. We show that the nominal increase in the 
gross domestic product     increase the value of the MPC.  
From the original work of Shibani on the consumer behavior, it appears that the Islamic 
economics is a pioneer in integrating the ethical dimension in the consumption function. The 
relevant ethical variables, explaining the consumption, could be summarized successively by 
the net earning of Zakat, fairness in the consumption efforts leading to a blessing in the 
earning, marginal earning for getting from the Almighty Allah a reward in this worldly life 
and afterlife, and the Zakat on both the individual earning and its assets. We can formulate the 
implicit equation of consumption by                                , subjected to the 
conditions (1a) and (1b) of the ethical consumption, where    stands for the private 
                                                 
8 I believe that these concepts, especially earning layers, need more analysis that makes them exploitable 
statistically and then could be testable in the empirical analysis. The renewal in the definition of earning would 
make a significant contribution to the Islamic economics literature through the classification of data depending 
on the Islamic economics model.  
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consumption of the families in Islamic community,    represents the disposable domestic 
earning (DDE),     is the marginal domestic earning of wealthy groups in favor of the needy 
groups,       indicates the Zakat function,    symbolizes the assets value to the end of the 
current year  . Using the average    and the standard semi-standard deviations   , and    of 
the consumption as follows, we define the overconsumption in the second condition of (1a) 
and the under-consumption in the second condition of (1b):  
                                                    
                               
   
                            
   
                                                     
                               
   
                            
  
where         and          represent the prescriptive and ethical consumption without 
wasteful or avarice and the unethical consumption with wasteful or avarice in time  , 
respectively. 
All the variables are expressed in constant prices. As a theoretical basis for the spending 
in the Islamic economy, this implicit consumption function indicates its intrinsic dynamic 
system over the time. It measures the marginal propensity to reduce the disparity in the gross 
domestic earning distribution not only through the conventional Zakat mechanism, but also 
through the marginal earning mechanism which increases directly the purchasing power of the 
poor and needy groups. To generalize this model of consumption, we expect that the 
government can implement new economic and social policies encouraging more ethics in the 
economy.  
The religious motivation, based on expected reward in the hereafter, does not require 
necessarily that such behavior should be generalized among all members of the society. 
Continuous efforts should be made to correct the individual or family deviations from the 
behavioral rules as defined by the Shariah’s goals.9 The impact of the individual behavior 
oriented-faith appears firstly at family and neighbor levels, and also, would be widened 
around the society area.  
In our framework, the individual ethical behavior, leading to ethical redistribution, should 
also incite the government to have a redistributive motive as an engine of its social and 
economic policies. Reciprocally, the ethical dimension of the government policies, through 
anti-poverty programs and smart compensation or/and social security mainly for health, 
education and housing, would help to develop ethical behaviors at the individual and family 
levels. The government has to use all available tools to improve the redistribution in the 
                                                 
9 The faith holding is a personal decision subjected approvingly to the Almighty Allah, but its construction is 
implemented with a dynamic interaction with the members of the society. The faith stability of a Muslim 
economic behavior depends on the effective operationality of the Islamic principles vis-à-vis to all members of 
the community either with null, lower or higher level of religious practices. Such positive behavior could extend 
the importance of Islamic faith holding between the members of society, and help for a cooperative connection 
between them. 
9 
 
society. Nevertheless, within an Islamic political economy framework, the government’s 
economic role as an actor would be at a minimum (Chapra 2014).  
The well-being that we propose is based on belief holding that orients the individual 
optimal utility. It is then different from conventional subjective utility, but it remains related 
to the social policy in an Islamic economy. The underlying welfare theory has a high moral 
content and appears similar to the welfare in Pigouvian sense i.e. as ethical concept 
(Bernheim and Rangel 2009, 2007). By mixing the mind and heart efforts, mobilizing divine 
revelations and the common reason, jointly they could allow to bring good motivation and 
bear moral filter that improve the spectrum of the social giving. The approach about ethical 
consumption is normative and prescriptive, but it does not suppose the predominance of ideal 
behavior. Also, its implementation is basically related to the intensity of the belief holding. 
Nevertheless, the leadership of the public at community or society levels should exhibit such 
ethical behaviors inciting the individuals and families for more cooperative well-being.
10
  
According to Shibani’s analysis, we assume that the society can be divided into three  
groups. The third is the richest group; the second is the middle group. The first is the poor 
group that gets the Zakat and the social giving from the other groups in the community. 
Hence, when we don’t consider the savings and assets of the wealthy group, the macro 
consumption function in the long-run can be as follows: 
                                                       
                 
where the parameter    represents the MPC for each group          The parameter    
stands for the share of the middle group in the domestic income, and    is the proportion of 
the wealthy group in the domestic income.    is the Zakat rate on the income that exceeds the 
legal threshold of the Zakat. The unobserved variable    indicates the other factors that affect 
the consumption behavior. By using the macro consumption function, we can determine the 
MPC in the long-run: 
            
   
   
                                                   
Whereas and depending on Shibani’s approach, if we assume that the marginal earning for the 
social solidarity, done by the affluent group, is expressed by             with     
 , where           indicates the output growth motivated by the righteous work, then the 
function of the MPC (2b) is enlarged by the following: 
                                                 
10 As indicated by the reviewer #2, the real ethical behavior, oriented by Islamic principles, has been omitted and 
lost for centuries in many of Muslim countries. But, even if there are many historical shocks and after the 
globalization that perturb the secondary features on Islamic consumer model, the core element of the ethical 
behavior persists. It still requires a permanent connection between worldly life and hereafter. The Almighty 
Allah fully and completely knows the veracity and intensity of such relationship. Such persistence would be 
running dynamically and independently to the existence or not of an Islamic regime. There is no automatic link 
between individual or familial beliefs and the government behavior even if this latter defines itself as following 
an Islamic system.   
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where    is the share of the benefactors of the marginal increase in the output. Also, we 
assume that the Zakat is applicable to this marginal income. Then, a significant part of this 
earning i.e.        is transferred to the targeted group. Besides, this group benefits from the 
Zakat on the marginal income. After that, the marginal net income of the Zakat of the wealthy 
group is               and the marginal income to the needy group is         
 3 1 3   . It is natural that the effort of the affluent group, to get an earning more highest 
than the previous earning, would increase their happiness in this worldly life and improve 
their reward in the afterlife. We expect that this ethical dimension, engendering the benign 
effects on the community members, will lead to competition among the members of the 
wealthy group. Thus, when this competition is activated, there would be a dynamic 
convergence in the marginal propensities of the consumption of the earning groups in the 
Islamic economy.  
From the MPC function, we define a full integration relationship between the marginal 
propensities for each group: 
                                                       
    
   
   
    
   
 
    
   
 
                                                    
     
   
   
     
   
  
     
   
 
With 
    
   
   and  
     
  
 
     
   
     . From the result (3b) in comparison to (3a), we 
deduce that the marginal income of the rich group leads to an increase in the livelihood of the 
poor group. So that their contribution is rising in the macro MPC: 
                                                      
    
   
                     
                                                      
    
   
                              
The effect of Zakat on the macro marginal propensity is mainly associated with the first 
difference between the marginal propensities of the poor group and the other group. Also, the 
activation of the marginal earning, to get more reward from righteous works and goodness, 
expands the effect of Zakat on the macro MPC by              . In principle, the income 
of the poor and needy group may not cover the necessities for decent living.
11
 Therefore, 
when this group gets the Zakat, their members can satisfy to some extent the farthermost 
necessities of eating and drinking, housing, clothing; they can reach the subsistence level. For 
the middle group, we assume that it has already an earning reaching the Zakat threshold, 
                                                 
11 The Zakat system, based on religious purposes, allows some marginal redistribution of earnings intrinsically 
and leads consequently to increase the macro consumption in the economy. Since that Zakat is not limited to 
income but touch also the assets, its impact on the aggregate consumption will be amplified and be more than the 
advocated impact expected by conventional Keynesian theory. 
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which makes this group able to satisfy the full basic needs and have a decent livelihood. Then, 
it could attain the sufficiency boundary.
12
 On this basis, it can be assumed that         . 
Then, for each increase in the rate of Zakat, even a tiny one, it will lead to a rise in the macro 
MPC.  
If we consider that the parameter    is a reflection of the parameters    and    through 
the determinant variables of the macro consumption, savings and assets that are Zakatable. 
The MPC cannot be dissociated from the Zakat process because it is influenced by the 
economic behaviors whether the productive system or consumption system. The conventional 
theory of consumption has been recently expanded to integrate the impact of the assets, i.e., 
the wealth effects (See, Metzler 1951). The analyses of the consumer utility and its effects on 
the consumer behavior have been done only in the late of the 19th century (around 1870) by 
the first marginalist school (Jevons, Menger, Walras, etc.) and continued to be improved. 
Also, the contemporary analysis inserts the precautionary saving to beware of surprise in the 
future (Nocetti & Smith 2011, Kimball & Weill 2009, Carroll 2009, Romer 2006, Campbell 
& Cochrane 1999, Kimball 1990). In Islamic economics, the consumption function primarily 
takes into account the effect of the assets on the macro consumption, as Zakat is applicable to 
both flows and assets when those attain the Zakat threshold. On the other hand, the consumer 
behavior of the wealthy group, which has an economic responsibility to conduct the 
investment effort, attempts to face the expected demand for consumption. The members of 
this group are cautious by adopting saving decisions during a normal environment and in 
particular for a precautionary purpose.  
 
3. Ethical permissible utility and its asymptotic elasticity 
The classification initiated by Shibani considers three earning processes. Each process would 
generate a corresponding layer of utility. The layer of spending that achieves a specific utility 
is defined according to the layer of earning. In this framework, the imperative utility 
corresponds to required G&S for a decent livelihood for each layer in the society and mostly 
the poor group. The imperative utility (IU) differs between earning layers; the imperative of 
the wealthy group is related to its social and economic position. But, the recommended utility 
will be possible through a recommended earning, which allows to achieve some self and 
family needs of the middle group. The ethical and belief holding behavior of the middle group 
helps to avoid the keeping up with the Joneses i.e. neighbors. This phenomenon is largely 
observed in many societies around the world (Luttmer 2005, and Stutzer 2004). Stutzer (2004) 
finds evidence that the neighbors materialistic aspirations might be shaped by spending 
models of those around them. Besides, the permissible utility is realizable through the 
permissible earning. Due to the ethics and belief holding, the wealthy group does not spend 
for luxury G&S and mostly when there are people in the society who cannot meet the 
                                                 
12 The sufficiency boundary is considered as an approximate level of decent living because it depends on the 
custom and convention of the community and the orientation of the Shariah scholars. It varies across time and 
social environment. 
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necessities. Also, even if there is no poor person in the society which is a very weak 
hypothesis, the wealthy group has to behave following the Shariah, which encourages the fair 
and equilibrated spending.  
 
3.1 Ethical Permissible marginal utility  
We can analyze Shibani’s model on the basis of the utility or usefulness by defining the 
imperative utility (IU), recommended utility (RU) and the permissible utility (PU). There are 
three groups of families in the community, depending on the layer of earning and the 
satisfaction levels that are related to also to three layers of the utility. On this basis, the 
families respond both gradually and successively to necessary utility i.e. IU, needed utility i.e. 
RU and extra needed utility i.e. PU.
13
 The wealthy group can satisfy all layer of utilities, but 
the poor group tries to meet the first layer of utilities i.e. IU. It is obvious that the first and 
second layers of utilities depend on the bundles of G&S. This dependence means that the 
middle (wealthy) group would have different G&S comparing to the poor (middle) group to 
satisfy the same layer of utilities IU (RU). Also, there is a negative utility, which is more 
specifically a form of damage that can be divided into two types: the illicit, i.e. not accepted 
by the Shariah and the hateful disapproved by the Shariah. We observe that the need is 
regulated and organized according to the legitimate determinants starting from the imperative 
to the recommended and, lastly, the permissible. It also depends on if this need is Shariah-
compliant and respecting the fairness in all the spending process.  
If we focus on the wealthy group, we can discuss the impact of their behavior, through 
the consumer utility   , on the consumption utility of the other groups. Mainly, that the 
wealthy group can satisfy all the layers of the utility from the vector   of G&S: the imperative 
across   , recommended through    and the permissible across   . Assuming that the believer 
wealthy group members will seek to meet the permissible utility totally or partially, if they 
know that the poor group assured their imperative utilities and that the middle group covered 
their recommended utilities. As stated in Shibani’s Kitab AlKassb (The Book of Earning) on 
page 6: “What was recognized as generalized utility is better, from the saying of the Prophet 
Mohammed (PBUH)
14
 “The better of the people who gives utilities to people.”.” Also, he 
showed the importance of the righteous work on page 12: “That there is no preference for  
additional earning that implies zero donations.” This makes the rich’s utility a function of the 
utility layers of the other groups, and thus the utility program of the wealthy believer is as 
follows:
15
  
                                                 
13 The proposed model includes the initial analysis of Shibani by using the traditional terminology, but appears 
more sophisticated by its modern cognitive content. Also, the economic analysis is operated deeply using tools 
of the mathematical economic analysis. 
14
 This prophetic saying is a traceable Hadith to son of Omar with a good reference and legally effective by 
Alalbani (www.alalbany.net/).  
15
 We suppose that the utility function is a continuous and increasing, but subjected to the law of diminishing 
marginal utility when the satisfaction is increased. The utility function is completely almost concave in   
 . 
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where    indicates the price index of the G&S of type   i.e. the imperative, recommended and 
the permissible.    refers to the budget allocated to the consumption spending of the wealthy 
group. This budget is related to    the disposable income net of the due Zakat and ready for 
the consumption expenses. Our focus is on the spending behavior knowing that      . It is 
evident from this model that the utility of permissible G&S is connected to the imperative 
utility i.e. necessities of the poor group and recommended utility i.e. needs of the middle 
group. Also, the social welfare utility function
16
     , which depends on the self and social 
usefulness, expresses that the permissible utility, through   , is not run by the affluent 
consumer unless he learns that most of the poor group families successfully managed to meet 
the marginal necessities i.e. imperatives    . And, that most of the middle group families 
succeeded to satisfy the marginal needs    . Thus, the coefficient  , measuring the belief 
holding of the wealthy group, indicates the partial activation of the permissible spending, and 
  must often be less than one:    .  
In a formulation due to Karl Weierstrass, the extreme value theorem affirms that a 
continuous utility function from a compact non-empty space to a subset of the real 
numbers attains a maximum and a minimum. Moreover, if the       is completely quasi-
concave, the solution is unique. Assuming the differentiability of      , we can distinguish 
the solution   
  by the first order conditions of derivative. Hence, there is a Lagrange 
multiplier     , which allows it to obtain the following partial derivation (Bertsekas 1999, 
1982): 
                                                               
   
    
   
       
  
    
       
In particular, we can reduce the first order conditions of derivation as follows, where   
represents the imperative or the recommended G&S of the wealthy group: 
       
      
       
        
                     
 
  
  
 
where        indicates the marginal rate of substitution of the good or service   to get the 
permissible good or service  . It means that the wealthy consumer renounces to a particular 
size of his good or service   to get one additional unit of  . The solution    
  and     
     
   
  
  maximize the utility function of a wealthy Muslim. By considering the faith dimension, the 
affluent consumer does not behave like Quaroon (a very fortunate person that lived during the 
                                                 
16 This social welfare utility function is close to the meaning of Harsanyi’s social welfare function (1955) which 
represents the un-weighted mean of the utilities of the individual social environment with an objective quantity. 
But, if Harsanyi (1955) insisted on individualistic ethics, the system (4) is based on social ethics. Also, in our 
case, the comparison between utilities or satisfactions is based on the belief holding and the ethics dimension of 
the members of the wealthy group.    
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period of the Prophet Moses PBUH), but wishes the approbation of the Almighty Allah 
(Montasser 1989). In principle, the attempt, towards the highest satisfaction of the utilities 
from the consumption of permissible G&S, leads to the following: 
   
  
  
    
       
This indicates that the permissible marginal utility is correlated to the extent of the interaction 
of the belief holding of the wealthy consumer with the change in the utilities satisfaction of 
the other groups or of his social environment through the element 
  
    
. This element is 
determined by the explicit form of the utility function     . By using the theory of the 
consumer equilibrium, we find an estimation of this element at an equilibrium point that 
represents the consumer preference: 
                                                  
  
     
 
  
  
 
   
 
   
 
 
  
  
 
   
 
   
 
 
If the affluent consumer knows the relative prices of the imperative, recommended and 
permissible G&S, and he can determine the marginal utilities of the imperative and 
recommended utilities relative to the permissible utility, then his/her belief holding interaction 
with the social environment carries him/her to a particular sacrifice by renouncing to a part of 
its PU. Such behavior contributes to a positive change, particularly in the imperative utility of 
the poor group and in the recommended utility of the middle group. Assuming that the 
average price of the permissible G&S exceeds the average price of the recommended and 
imperative G&S; and if the imperative and recommended marginal utility is greater than the 
permissible marginal utility; then the faith or the belief holding interaction element is: 
                                                                        
  
     
   
Consequently, when the effective willpower of the wealthy Muslim consumer’s faith is 
activated, then an overall positive change will occur in the imperative utility of the poor group 
and recommended utility of the middle group. This positive change is measured at least by the 
quantity  
  
     
   , which can be converted into purchasing capabilities towards the 
targeted group through social and economic security tools. Explicitly, such transfer to the 
needy group is operated either directly or institutionally organized by specific social 
associations to manage the distribution of the social fund to targeted families efficiently.  
According to Saez and Stantcheva (2016) an additional purchase power matters more for 
lower income individuals than for higher income individuals. This principle of transfer is the 
core of Islamic economics principles such that the individual, near relatives, family, 
neighborhood and community have to organize anti-poverty programs through Zakat funds, 
Sadakat social giving and Waqf funds oriented by the faith.  
If it is possible to rectify the initial acquisition of property according to justice principle, 
the running of economic re-allocation of resources among people could reduce the inequality 
15 
 
between layers of earning in the society. Even if the injustice is reduced, the inequality will 
remain due to many factors as the abilities and talents differences in the society.
17
 In 
consequence, the redistribution will have a significant role to shrink more the inequalities and 
escape the risk of social instability and insecurity. The Zakat system, Islamic social giving, 
and the Waqf system are better redistribution tools leading to more economic justice and less 
poverty. 
After the activation of social welfare, we expect that the increase in the permissible 
spends will not lead to depriving the low-income group to achieve a decent livelihood and 
satisfy the necessary utilities. Further, in case of the highest and deepest belief holding in the 
society and when the middle group succeeds to self-achieve most of their needs of a decent 
life, it could be possible that the poor group would fully benefit from the purchasing 
capabilities transfer. Then, the permissible spending would not adversely affect the process of 
the economic behavior of the other groups in the community. 
 
3.2 Asymptotic elasticity of the ethical utility  
In principle, when we use concave functions, i.e. curving in, we face the problem of 
homogeneity loss of these concave functions. Thus, we turn to the    condition in the Orlicz 
spaces theory (Krasnosel'skii and Rutickii 1961, Rao and Ren 1991). Such condition replaces 
the homogeneity property with a minimum limit that allows for determining the limit of the 
asymptotic elasticity of the utility when the permissible spending     tends to infinity. It can 
be assumed that the utility function of the wealthy group is subjected to the condition of the 
reasonable asymptotic elasticity (Kramkov and Scachermayer 1997). We have the following 
Lemma 1. 
Lemma 1: Considering that the utility function    in the system (4) is strictly concave, 
increasing and having real number values by the variables    . Then the asymptotic elasticity 
      is defined clearly and with        , we have 
                                                               
     
    
     
        
               
                         
Proof: Using that   
  is a monotone and decreasing positive function for all      , we have  
       
                  
         
       
Considering that there exists some   in an open interval           and by the mean value 
theorem, we obtain 
                           
       
                                                 
17 In comparison to our model oriented redistribution, Kalecki’s model (1942) is more oriented to income 
distribution between profits and wages. This latter depends on the structure of market imperfections and of 
markets power. This model has not focus on theorizing redistribution. Nevertheless, by reducing such 
imperfections, power and biased pricing system, it is possible to increase ceteris paribus the income of the 
middle and poor groups in the society. But, it remains that in the real world the inflation process, through pricing 
strategies, could erode the additional purchase power of the needy and middle social groups. Also, taxation falls 
heavily on wage earners. 
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Then,   
       
                  
         
                              
       
Therefore, with    
     
            or        , 
     
     
    
     
        
         
    
     
       
  
              
         
         
The inequality (8) is similar to the condition    in the theory of Orlicz spaces (Biagini 
and Frittelli 2008). The result (8) of Lemma 1 is deduced from the elasticity of the wealthy 
group utility to     i.e.          . Also, the variable    reflects the benefit from the 
permissible G&S by taking into account the positive change in the imperative utility or lowest 
necessities of the poor group and recommended utility or highest necessities of the middle 
group. The asymptotic elasticity includes that when     tends towards values increasingly to 
infinity, then the faith dimension of the wealthy group means that this group gets a unitary 
elasticity as a maximum limit of their utility. It is obvious that the explicit form of the utility 
function    and the partial utility function      have a significant role in assimilating the 
meaning of the condition (8).  
By the result (8) of Lemma 1 where the wealthy consumer does not neglect the changes 
in the utilities of the middle and poor groups, it is expected that the relative increase in the 
income of the wealthy group does not necessarily lead to a rise in its enthusiasm for the 
permissible and desirable G&S. This outcome differs from what is prevailing in the 
conventional economic analysis, where the increase in the income of the wealthy people 
inevitably leads to a substantial increase in obtaining luxury G&S. This widespread idea 
includes the point that the elasticity of the utility could be greater than the unity i.e. the 
opposite of what we obtain when belief holding and ethical behavior are jointly activated. 
By assuming that the composite utility function      consists of a social welfare function 
     , which is positive and defined from   
  to    and where the coefficient       
measures the extent of the social altruism (Kolm and Ythier 2006) and the Shariah-compliant 
abstaining of the wealthy consumer and his/her family. It also shows the range of the 
thankfulness of the Almighty Allah for the blessing, the beneficence and the renewed 
kindness. This latter expresses the transfer of a part of the self-permissible utility value to the 
poor and middle groups, respectively. So that the social welfare function is related implicitly 
to the imperative G&S of the poor group and recommended G&S of the needy group.   
                                                                                    
where      defines the inverted social utility function. We assume that a social welfare 
function leads to positive change in the imperative utilities of the poor group and 
recommended utilities of the needy group of people to lift their difficulties and expand their 
materialistic needs. If the legitimate social altruism disappears after that the Shariah obliged 
Zakat is performed, then we have    . And thus, the wealthy consumer spends on him/her 
self and his/her family without keeping anything for the poor and the needy people i.e. that 
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       . On the basis that the marginal increase in the imperative G&S acts, even partially, 
to redress the poverty of the first group and thus to increase their imperative materialistic 
utilities, we assume from the equation (9) that: 
             
    
    
     
    
    
        
     
    
   
     
    
         
Through the belief holding and ethical behavior of the wealthy group by improving the 
situation of the poor and needy people and based on the afterlife dimension, a new variable 
    can be generated to expand the reward that the Muslim expect to get in particular in the 
afterlife (Zarqa 1980, Zarqa 1992). In such cases, the members of the wealthy group can 
enjoy a part of the reward in this worldly life through their thanksgiving, from the evidence 
mentioned by the Almighty Allah in Chapter 14 Ibrahim (Abraham) in verse 7 “And when 
your Lord proclaimed: “If you give thanks, I will grant you increase; but if you are ungrateful, 
My punishment is severe.”.” This increase occurs before the afterlife in a form of hidden 
support. But, their signs are tangible and perceptible such as the affliction pushing, kindness 
of the predestination, benediction in spending, benediction in earnings, longevity, and healthy 
wellness, righteous progeny and others. As well as the psychological satisfaction that is 
achieved when the social welfare function is activated. Then, many marginal utilities are 
generated from sacrificing a part of the permissible utility. And then, the utility function is 
expanded with an otherworldly dimension, it can be termed by a steady eternal utility function 
that can be formulated as follows: 
                                                     
                           
    
                  
                           
  
Also, the otherworldly utility is greater and eternal than the constrained worldly life 
utility according to the Almighty Allah in Chapter 9 Attawbah (The repentance) in verse 38: 
“O you who believe! What is the matter with you, when it is said to you, “Mobilize in the 
cause of God,” you cling heavily to the earth? Do you prefer the present life to the afterlife? 
The enjoyment of the present life, compared to the afterlife, is only a little.”  
Furthermore, the worldly life utilities are subject to the arithmetic and logic rules, while 
the utility in the afterlife exceeds the mathematical arithmetic and logic.
18
 The otherworldly 
utility is infinite in terms of the enjoying time and the multiple colors and tastes of the good 
and pure things. Principally, in case of the attempt for righteous works and connecting to the 
Halal i.e. Shariah-compliant utilities to their otherworldly dimension as the righteous ancestor 
was doing goodness, it will be more advantageous to use convex utility functions i.e. curving 
out. We can prove that the elasticity of the utility to the spending in the cause of the Almighty 
                                                 
18
 The conventional propriety of decreasing marginal utility of materialistic G&S could be tested and appeared to 
be acceptable in common sense. Meanwhile, I expect that the marginal utility of ethical G&S and money, 
through giving goods, time and money is not necessarily a decreasing function.   
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Allah is more than one. By using that           is positive and strictly increasing function, 
meaning that                  , then with        and        , we have  
              
           
  
   
 
   
             
  
    
             
  
   
   
 
 
which implies that  
     
            
            
   
When     the spending in the cause of the Almighty Allah tends to infinity, we can 
determine the limit of the asymptotic elasticity. It can be assumed that a steady eternal utility 
function of the wealthy group indicates an improved condition of the asymptotic elasticity, 
according to the following lemma 2. 
Lemma 2: Considering that the utility function    in the system (11) is strictly convex, 
increasing and having real number values by the variables    , then the asymptotic elasticity 
      is defined explicitly by 
                                                          
     
    
     
            
                   
                         
Proof: Using that   
  is a monotone, positive and strictly increasing function for all      . 
Considering that there exists some   in an open interval           and by the mean value 
theorem, we have  
       
                      
             
          
                                
           
and therefore, with        , 
     
     
    
     
            
             
    
     
    
                              
          
             
        
Also, the result (12) of lemma 2 is deduced by using the elasticity of the wealthy group 
utility to     i.e.          . When the sacrifice of a rich group is greater, then the social 
utility will be improved through a marginal increase in the social welfare in particular for the 
poor and needy groups. This outcome corroborates with the proposition 1 of Elgin et al. 
(2013) which indicates that religious-motivated voluntary redistribution provides higher direct 
satisfaction. Also, a reward for this sacrifice is raised in the worldly life and in the afterlife by 
     through any marginal increase of the hidden returns of such sacrifice in the earthly life. 
Such sacrifice is positively reflected on the marginal steady eternal utility through an elastic 
utility, depending on the promise of the Almighty Allah, stating in Chapter 17 Alisraa (The 
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night journey) in verse 21: “See how we have favored some of them over others; yet the 
afterlife is greater in ranks and greater in favors.”  
 
3.3 Discussion  
The classification of Shibani is not similar to the conventional classification of necessities, 
normal and luxury G&S, but it is deduced from Islamic principles. With pure materialistic 
behavior, the good luxury spending will be increased if the earning is increased leading to an 
earning elasticity of spending (EES) greater than one. However, if the earning of the Muslim 
wealthy group is increased, the permissible spending will be increased leading to an EES 
lesser than one, since because of the ethical and belief holding incite to transfer a fraction of 
the change in earning to the needy people. So there is a positive externality on the other 
group’s well-being because the wealthy group members transfer real purchasing power to the 
poor and needy groups. Hence, these members are willing to augment the imperative and 
recommended marginal utilities of the needy families. These outcomes are in contradiction 
with the findings of Luttmer (2005). Luttmer suggests that an increase in the individual 
income leads to a negative externality on neighbor’s well-being that is of the same order of 
magnitude as the positive effects on individual well-being.   
From our modeling, the increasing earnings of the wealthy Muslim improve the well-
being of the poor. The conventional neoclassical models lead to the same conclusion through 
different channel and exerting what is known as a “trickle-down effect”, but such effects 
appear indirectly and take a particular time to improve the economic situations of the needy 
people. In contrast, the social impact of social Infaq is done directly and enhances the 
satisfaction of needy people immediately.  
According to Bernheim and Rangel (2007, 2009), there is an absence of a general 
framework for behavioral welfare analysis. I expect that, since the Islamic economics exhibits 
general principles, the social and ethical dimensions of Islamic economics could renew 
somewhat the welfare analysis in economic modeling.  
The conventional economics is fundamentally based on secular worldview, and then 
develops its paradigm from the human knowledge; the Islamic economics is based on Quran 
and Sunnah as divine knowledge and complementary on Fiqh subjected to Quran and Sunnah. 
Indeed, there is a universal knowledge in economics. Also, as Islamic economics completely 
integrates the analysis of human wellbeing in its main research goals, such analysis becomes 
more complex because many factors mobilized social, ethical, political and others qualitative 
and quantitative determinants.   
According to North (1990), the institutional analysis into neoclassical theory requires 
modifying the existing corpus theory. The insertion of Islamic economics principles and 
concepts is not only a theoretical construction of the real life but guidance and advice in 
everything of life that should connect the temporarily stay worldly life to the ultimate 
destination afterlife. It would improve and promote more deep analysis in economics even 
that its paradigms are sourced principally from the Quran and Sunnah as divine sources and 
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secondary from the consensus of Islamic scholars and the analogy methodology. In Islamic 
economics there are a lot of moral values and humankind fraternity; however conventional 
economics assumes the predominance of the individual interest behavior. Islamic economics 
has to exhibit, measure, appreciate and evaluate to what extent the faith and moral values, 
rules of behavior, and the social and political institutions are observed and applied by the 
Muslims community.   
From the neoclassical perspective, the government intervenes in private markets to 
correct market failures and address with inequality by redistributing resources (Bernheim and 
Rangel 2007). If the nominal wage is less than a specified minimum wage, a transfer program 
for the benefit of the disadvantaged people can be implemented at individual, family, 
community and government levels. But, practically the administrative cost to manage such 
programs would be prohibitive. In Islamic society, I expect there will be more private charity 
management through specific institutions, like the Waqf system, collecting and redistributing 
social giving, in addition to Zakat managed historically through Islamic government agencies. 
The redistribution should increase with income inequality.  
Shibani’s earning theory can justify progressive ethical giving to needy people to correct 
more the initial distribution. The engine of the progressive ethical religious giving depends on 
the faith holding intensity and hidden positive returns of financial sacrifice appearing in the 
earthly life and mainly the afterlife. Additionally, the self-enjoying process is generated when 
social giving is done with religious fidelity, and the happiness should happen. Such hidden 
returns could not be revealed intentionally or unintentionally by the individual or family of a 
wealthy group.       
The reward of financial sacrifice, through social spending (Infaq) of individuals and 
families, generates a high earning from Allah. Also, the Islamic moral well-being leads to that 
both wealthy and poor gain; whereas in the conventional approach, when the transfer is done, 
the rich lose and the poor gain. The fairness approach has been clarified through conditional 
utility which takes into account the utility function of the needy people. The subjective 
wellbeing or happiness could be generated continuously through Zakat system and mainly the 
social Infaq (spending) because this latter is operational during all the time of a year and not 
related to a regular timing as Zakat. 
As indicated by Gintis (1998), the needy people care about redistribution processes as 
well as their outcomes. The redistribution is managed mainly at individual, family, 
community and society levels. The mechanism serving to correct the economic situations of 
the needy people should be implemented progressively until that the necessary satisfaction of 
the first layer of the society is done. The progressivity of social spending requires developing 
randomized detailed surveys that question targeted population of needy individuals and 
families about their mental, moral, spiritual and social states (Kuziemko et al. 2015).
19
 The 
generalized weights directly reflect society’s concerns for fairness, and can be defined 
                                                 
19 It is hard to detect and observe ethical behaviors. Some specific questionnaire from stochastic samples may 
exhibit the characteristics of some believers when doing social giving.  
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following a broad set of justice concepts (for more details see Saez and Stantcheva 2016). The 
generalized weights, through utility functions, can be understood from individual and 
aggregate features that could lead to fair redistribution. The Waqf system is an excellent real 
road map of such generalized weighting that contributes to improving the well-being of needy 
people and correct some remaining inequities. 
According to verse 21 in Chapter 17, it is clear that the rich man/women in his/her 
earning needs the poor earners to achieve the otherworldly reward while the opposite is not 
true. Also, even if the consumption effort of the wealthy Muslim is considered a worship in its 
broad meaning, then he/she gets a reward from his/her materialistic imperative and 
recommended utilities.
20
 But, he/she will be rewarded more when he/she reduces his/her 
permissible utilities to achieve some of the imperative and recommended utilities of the poor 
and the needy groups, respectively. Also, we will address in a future paper the utility 
functions to highlight the interaction in the changes of the utility determinants. We will use 
the decomposition method in Slutsky equation (1880-1948) to analyze more fully the impact 
of the ethics and the belief holding on the utility. Also, I expect to integrate the multi-utility 
function by considering the materialistic and faith dimensions in the optimal processes of the 
consumer behavior simultaneously. 
The Almighty Allah has ordered that a Muslim and his/her family have to avoid, from the 
tradition, heresy, habits and lifestyle, all that is contrary to the Shariah and the legal objectives 
of the Islamic principles (Shariah Maqasid). The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) warned in 
another Hadith narrated by Attabaraani with a good reference attributed to Abdul Rahman bin 
Auf, that the Messenger (PBUH) of the Almighty Allah said: “the archenemy, May Allah 
damn him, said: I will tempt the rich/money owners in three ways: to gain money in 
prohibited ways, to spend it using wrong methods and prevent them giving to the poor.”  
The protection from some of conventional consumption models is required when such 
models are in contradiction to the quietude of the human psyche. But, these models are 
strongly supported by cultural factors, specific media and the internet (for more details, Ng 
and Lee 2015). Such information technology could excite the desires and pleasures of the 
human being, and could decay his/her honorable ethics values and causing a dynamic 
weakness in his/her faith. Many consumers tend to adopt imported consumer behaviors. 
Therefore, the members of the Islamic community need to establish and install ethical and 
faith values in the new generation in all aspects of worldly life such as home, school, and 
market. Such a strategy could protect the individual and his/her family from the evils of all 
consumption behaviors that cause deviation in his/her appropriate and fair spending behavior. 
This latter is based on Halal earning, prioritizing Halal spending on good and pure things 
without lavishness or wastefulness and miserliness or avariciousness. The legitimate controls 
of the legal objectives of Shariah (Maqasid) are explained in several pioneer contributions 
about such purposes (Jouini 1028-1085 AD, Ghazali 1058-1111 AD, Shatiby 1320-1388 AD). 
                                                 
20 The Muslim praises the Almighty Allah when he/she takes the G&S because his intention is to get more 
spiritual energy to achieve its legal objectives i.e. work and worship.  
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They are extended and clarified in some recent papers (Raissouni 1992, Alkhadmi 2001, 
Almassri 2001). These Shariah controls lead to saving the religion, human being, mind, 
progeny and money. 
 
4. Conclusions 
This paper treats Shibani’s (750-805 AD, 131-189 AH) analysis of earning, consumer utility 
and social spending by using utility modeling. According to Shibani’s model, the imperative 
earning face the spending on necessities, the recommended earning consists of enlarging some 
needs and the permissible earning expands the spending scope to the self, family or the social 
needs. Shibani considers that the earning is related to the economic activities in every era and 
that the spending size depends basically on the spending budget that cannot be dissociated 
from the available income for the expenditure. He considers that the earning and the spending 
have multi-dimensionally facets related to devotional, material, ethical and social levels. He 
conceives that the attempt in enlarging earning is similar to the effort in the required worship 
and the voluntary adoration. For that reason, there are three layers of earning: the imperative, 
recommended and the permissible. It appears that the fair and upright Muslim consumer has 
to prioritize his/her spending according to the needs of him/her self and his/her family with 
respect to the earning layer. Such priorities consist on the imperative spending to get the 
necessary utility, followed by recommended spending to reach the recommended utility, after 
that the permissible spending to achieve the permissible utility. This latter spending consists 
of expanding the extent of needs to enjoy the G&S of the worldly life without exceeding the 
overspending threshold. Such self-control is based on the afterlife reward as a one of the most 
significant incentives that regulate and control the individual and the Muslim community 
behaviors.  
The most significant contributions of this paper are firstly that the impact of Zakat on the 
MPC is mainly related to the first difference in the marginal propensity of the poor group and 
the marginal propensity of the middle and wealthy groups. In principle, the Zakat system is 
based on both the flows and the tradable assets that lead to potential returns. So the Islamic 
consumption function integrates the impact of the assets on the macro consumption. 
Secondly, we focus on the wealthy group due to its ability to get every layer of utility from 
the imperative to the permissible. Considering that the believer wealthy group members do 
not seek to meet the permissible utility completely, but only partially. Because the wealthy 
utilities function is a function of the utility layers of the other groups through a coefficient that 
measures the extent of the altruism and the Shariah-compliant abstaining. The social welfare 
function renders the affluent consumer’s permissible marginal utility connected to the extent 
of the interaction of his/her belief holding with the change in the utility satisfaction of the 
other groups. Such interaction drives to the transfer of purchasing capabilities towards the 
targeted group. We find that the faith dimension of wealthy group means that this group gets a 
unitary value of the elasticity as a limit sup of their asymptotic elasticity of the utility. Also, 
this belief holding generates new variables related to the afterlife world consisting of the 
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bestowed reward and hidden support as worldly life reward. Other rewards will be created in 
the afterlife implying to a steady eternal utility function and conducting to an optimum of the 
marginal utility with elasticity greater than one.      
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5. Appendices 
5.1 Biographic information on Shibani 
Firstly, we display a brief summary about Imam Muhammad ibn Hassan Shibani (750-805 
AD, 131-189 AH) to understand the historical environment in which he produced the 
concepts of earning and spending. He was born between Kufa and Basra in 131 AH after his 
father came from the east of Damascus. He has evolved in Kufa, which was an environment 
of science and scientist. He was a genius and a talented person from his young age. At the age 
of fourteen years, he joined in a scientific circle of Imam Abu Hanifa (699-767 AD, 80-150 
AH). He completed the Fiqh conferences by Judge Abu Yusuf (731-798 AD, 113-182 AH). 
During his era, he acquired the religious knowledge from many reputed imams of Shariah 
science in Kufa, Mecca, Medina and Damascus. He was an early scholar (Faqih) of the Iraq, 
and a young Imam in the Quran, the Sunnah, the Fiqh, the Arabic, the Algebra science and 
others. He was the teacher of the imams such as Imam Shafii (767-820 AD, 150-204 AH). 
Also, he was a judge of Arraqa in the period of Abbasid Caliph Harun Alrrashid (763-809 
AD, 146-193 AH). He had realized the codification of Islamic jurisprudence and classified 
this latter using a new approach. He produced the statements in discreetly and clarity manner 
and addressed the most complicated subjects in the Shariah that mattered to detect the 
legislation secrets (Nadawi 1994). Shibani has dealt with the financial and economic issues 
and mainly in unprecedented depth the topics related to earning, saving and spending. He is 
the pioneer that analyzed the Islamic economics issues with a new approach (Dounia 1998, 
Eldasoqi 1987). Shibani was among those precursors who addressed the legal objectives of 
the Shariah (Shariah Maqasid) early before the work of Jouini (1028-1085 AD, 419-478 AH).  
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